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I. INTRODUCTIO 
The once innovative provisions of New Zealand's Family Protection 
legislation 1 suffer from the serious flaw that they may be rendered nuga-
tory if ·the deceased dealt with his property, during his lifetime, in such 
a way as to exclude the court's jurisdiction. 2 Deserving claimants may 
be defeated, intentionally or unintentionally; by inter vivos dispositions, 
outright or to trustees. The focus of this paper will be on a second 
expedient: a contract in which the testator agrees to devise or bequeath 
property in his will. 3 
Section 4(1) of the Family Protection Act 1955 provides: 
... if any person ( in this Act referred to as the 
deceased) dies, whether testate or intestate, and in 
terms of his will or as a result of his intestacy 
adequate provision is not available from his estate 
for the proper maintenance and support thereafter of 
the persons by whom and on whose behalf application 
may be made under this Act as aforesaid 4 , the court 
may, at its discretion on application so made, 
order that such provision as the court thinks fit 
shall be made out of the es&a&e of &he deceased 
for all or any of those persons. 
Because the 'estate of the deceased' is neither defined 5 , not is 
its meaning abundantly clear from the context of the Act, some courts 
have held that contracted testamentary property is not included within 
the section 4(1 ) meaning of 'estate' because it was not free for the 
deceased to dispose of as he chose. 6 According to this interpretation, 
called the credi~cr ~heard , under the contract the promisee receives a 
right to an effectual transfer of the relevant asset under the promisor's 
will, thus the promisee is to be treated as a person having rights to the 
nominated benefit arising independently of the will under a contract to 
devise or bequeath. The promisee is, therefore, in the position of a 
creditor, and will be satisfied ahead of applicants under the Family Pro-
tect ion Act. The contrary view, called the bene,,-r:. ~ia.r:3 theOY"::J 7 , is that 
the promisee receives the property as a beneficiary in the testator's will 
and must , therefore, be subject to any law affecting a beneficiary under 
a will, including the jurisdiction of the court to make a family provision 
order. 
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The recent judgment of White J. in Br euer v . Wright 8 , itself 
inconsistent with an earlier High Court judgment of Wild C.J. in Re 
Webs ter (decd . ) 9 , draws attention to two conflicting Privy Council analyses 
of whether a contractual testamentary provision is subject to a family pro-
tection order : I n r e Dil!on (deed . ) , Dillon v . PLJ:Zic Trustee and Others 10 
(appealed from the Supreme Court of New Zealand), in which the Board 
approved the 'beneficiary theory', and Schaefer v. Schuhmann 11 (appealed 
from the Sup. Court of New Sout ~ Wales), in which the'creditor' theory' was 
preferred. 
The issue to be considered in this paper 1 2 is whether the promisee 
under a contract to confer a benefit by will is a creditor or a beneficiary 
of the estate of the deceased. After detailing the judicial history of 
this dilemma, it is proposed to examine the competing policy considerations: 
freedom of testation and sanctity of contract versus the statutory objec-
tive of adequate provision for dependents of deceased persons. Finally, 
the writer will suggest an equitable solution to the cont roversy. 
" .,,, . 
I I. NEW ZEALAND FAMILY PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
A. Legislative History 1 3 
Relative freedom of testamentary disposition was characteristic of 
English ·law in the nineteenth century. 1 4 Sometimes this resulted in a 
testator disregarding his family obligations and making insufficient or 
no provision for his wife and children. This was prevented in systems 
of law, such as in Scotland, which are founded upon the Roman Civil Law, 
by setting aside for the widow and children definite shares of the estate. 1 5 
The spirit of reform which was active in New Zealand at the turn of the 
century created an exception to the English nonn which was unique in the 
field of family provision legislation in the Common Law world. The Testa-
mentary Family Maintenance Act 1900 gave the court jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances to override a person's testamentary dispositions and to 
substitute for them provisions which the court thought fit. The purpose 
of the legislation can be seen from its title: 
An Act to insure ... Provision for Testator's Families. 
The Act of 1900 was subject to amendment 16 , and was later embodied 
in a consolidating measure, the Family Protection Act 1908. Section 33(1) 
provided for the maintenance of the family of any testator who had by his/ 
her will not made adequate provision therefor, an order for provision to be 
made out of the "estate of the said deceased person". That Act was in 
turn extensively amended 1 7 so as to extend the principle of the legislation 
to the estates of intestates and to widen the class of possible applicants. 
The law was again consolidated in the Family Protection Act 1955, section 
33(1) became section 4(1) in the new Act. 
B. Application 18 
The legislation entrusted the judiciary with the task of implementing 
the statutory scheme of "adequate provision for proper maintenance and 
support". In an obvious example of judicia) lawmaking, the courts invented 
the 'moral duty' test so that the Act would not avail only to self-evidently 
"needy" claimants. Salmond J. in Re AZlen (de d . ) 1 9 declared that the 
Act was designed to enforce the moral obligations of the testator to make 
such provisions as a just and wise father would make in the interests of 
4. 
his dependants had he been fully aware of all the relevant circumstances. 20 
In that case, it was said that the surviving spouse need only show that 
the testator had failed to make proper provision for her maintenance as 
would enable her to 21 
... live with comfort and without anxiety in such 
state of life as she was accustomed to in [his] 
1 i fetime. 
This reflects the generous and liberal application of the Act by the New 
Zealand courts. One commentator suggests the rationale for the moral 
duty test is that the Act is concerned with the protection of the fa mi ly 
as a unit in society. For this reason 22 
the courts became concerned not only with 
economic questions of necessities and substance 
but also with the ethical questions of morality 
and family justice. 
III. THE OSCILLATING CASE LAW 
A. Dillon v . Public Trustee of New Zealand 
1. The Facts 
As a compromise to litigation brought against him by his children, 
Henry Dillon contracted to leave, by his last will, his farm on trust for 
one son and two daughters in equal shares, subject to an annuity in favour 
of a third daughter. Two years later, the testator, aged 81 and a widower 
married again. He made a fresh will setting out the promised provisions 23 , 
leaving the residue of his estate to his second wife. 
2. Supreme Court 2 4 
On an application by the widow under the New Zealand Family Protec-
tion Act 1908 , Northcraft J. held at first instance that the court was not 
precluded from encroaching upon the contractual devise of the farm lands 
should that be necessary to make adequate provision for the second wife. 
Accordingly he made an order in her favour. The learned judge agreed 
with the view of Chapman J. expressed in Gardiner v. Boag2 5 , discussed 
and approved by the Full Court in Pari sh v. Parish 2 6 , that the Act is 2 7 
... a declaration of state policy, and that, as such, 
it is paramount to all contracts. 
Those two cases decided a wife could not surrender her statutory right to 
maintenance and support out of the estate of the deceased husband in a 
contract with her husband, before or after the marriage. His Honour, 
Northcroft J, reasoned 28 : 
... a fortiori, a husband may not contract himself 
out of his obligations even though the contract be 
made before marriage. 
3. Court of Appeal 2 9 
The Court of Appeal held that since the devise of the land was made 
in fulfilment of a contract for valuable consideration, the land was not 
available to satisfy the claim of the applicant. Advocating the creditor 
theory, Ostler J observed that such a contract, if made with a stranger, 
6. 
would have, upon the testator's death, made that stranger a creditor of 
the estate with an enforceable claim against it. 30 The majority em-
phasised that the contract was made in the ordinary course of business, 
and the fact that it was with the testator's own children should not make 
any difference. Chief Justice Myers referred to the rights of the 
promisees under the contract to enforce their interest in the particular 
property (e.g. right to recover damages equal to the value of the equity 
of the lands if the contract is breached or unperformed), and concluded 
that it would be extraordinary if the law permitted them to be in a worse 
position if the Family Protection Act applied than if the testator had 
committed a breach of his contract. :l 
The Chief Justice was of the view that the learned judge below had 
misapplied the two authorities upon which he relied - the statute was only 
paramount to contracts between the testator and entitled claimants in which 
the latter surrenders their rights under the Act. However, Myers CJ and 
Ostler J would allow an exception to their general rule if the purpose of 
the contract was to abrogate the widow's statutory rights, because this 
would be in breach of the statutory duty on the part of the testator. In 
the writer's opinion, this exception is not supported by logic: a bona fide 
intention should not defeat a duty, if such exists; nor should a mala fide 
intention affect the character of tne property, because the contract itself 
is not tainted with fraud. Whetner it is supported by policy will be 
discussed in Part IV of this paper. 
In his dissenting judgment, Srith J said the farming lands were part 
of the estate because they passed b~· the exercise of the testamentary power 
and by nothing else. As a formula:ion of the beneficiary theory, he argued 
that the agreement created no rights in land whatever, only rights to have 
the last will made in a particular ~ay and the testator had fulfilled his 
contract by fraring his will in that way. 
make an order over the property. 
4. Privy Council 32 
As a result, the court could 
On a further appeal, the udicial Committee of the Privy Council re-
stored the order of Northcraft~. fcllowing closely the reasoning of Smith 
J. The testator's children, iscc.., t Simon, L.C., giving the opinion of 
the Board, saic, were simply de isees and not creditors. The testator did 
7. 
what he had contracted to do, and if he had broken his contract 
children's rights to damages or specific perfonnance would have 
the 
to be 
assessed or granted subject to the possible or actual impact of the power 
of the court under the Act. Their Lordships were prompted by their per-
ception of the intention of the Act. They stated 33 : 
The manifest purpose of the Family Protection Act, 
however, is to secure on grounds of public policy, 
that a man who dies, leaving an estate which he 
distributes by his wi 11 , sha 11 not be permitted to 
leave widow and children inadequately provided for. 
The Board disagreed with Northcroft J who regarded s.33 of the 1908 
Act as imposing upon a husband the 'obligation' to make adequate testamentarJ 
provision for the maintenance and support of his wife. Rather, the Privy 
Council considered the statute conferred upon the court a discretionary 
jurisdiction to overr ide what would otherwise be the operation of a will 
by ordering that additional provision should be made for certain relations 
out of the testator's estate, notwithstanding the provisions which the will 
actually contained. 34 Although the testator's will-making power remains un-
restricted, in this writer's opinion it is fictional to suggest there is 
no duty on the testator to frame his will in a certain way. The legal 
sanction is the intervention of the courts to alter the dispositions. 
Viscount Simon made the significant corrment 35 : 
The interposition of the court should take place, of 
course, only after considering all relevant circumstances, 
and among these circumstances may be the fact that the 
testator was under obligation to third parties. 
Their Lordships thus acknowledged, in part, the princi ples of sanctity and 
certainty of contract and the respect which should be accorded to them. 
To the Privy Council which decided uiZlo~ v . ?wJlic Tr-.A.S :ee cf Ne~ Zeclanc , 
a balancing of interests would always be in order, but family provision 
which is 'reasonable' in the circumstances was the predominant principle. 
5. Reaction 
Dillor. 's case received a mixed response, further emphasising the 
i neons is tent 1 aw on this subject. In ::iv. v. :err~,.; 3 ' , a case on a 11 
\I') 
::s: 





fours with Dillon , decided in the Ontario Court of Appeal, Laidlaw J.A. 
thought that Dillon was wrongly decided. Gil landers J.A., in the same 
case, accepted Dil:on as rightly dec i ded. Egbert J. in the Supreme 
Court of Alberta said by way of dictum that Dillon was a somewhat sur-
prising decision 37 , but it was accepted as correct in In re Brown (decd . ) 38 
by Turner J in the New Zealand Supreme Court. Disapproval of the Privy 
Council decision prompted exempting sections being included in the statutes 
of Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskat-
chewan. These sections state that where a testator bona fide and for 
valuable consideration contracts to leave property by will, such property 
shall be exempt from the statute except to the extent that the property 
exceeds the consideration received by the testator. 39 
The New Zealand Family Protection Act, however, was re-enacted in 
1955 after Dillon 's case with no relevant amendments. Under well-established 
practices in statutory construction, that case should be rega rded as having 
been approved and endorsed by legislation re-enacted i n virt ually the same 
terms. 4 0 
B. Schaefer v . Schuhmann 
1. The Facts 
The testator, Edward Seery, engaged a housekeeper, Mrs Elizabeth 
Schaefer, at a weekly wage. By a codicil to his will, he left his house 
and land to her if she was still employed by him as a housekee per at the 
date of his death. Mrs Schaefer read the document before it was executed. 
Because he had left her the house the testator soon stopped paying her wages. 
On this evidence, the Privy Council held that the testator had bound him-
self by an enforceable contract to leave the property to his housekeeper by 
his will . 4 1 After his death, his four adult daughters applied for further 
provision under the terms of the Testator's Family Maintenance and Guardian-
ship of Infants Act 1916-1954: the terms of s.3(1) of that Act being in-
di stinguishable from s.33 (1) and s.4 (1) of the New Zealand Family Protection 
Acts. 
2. Supreme Court of New South Wales 4 2 
In the Supreme Co ur t of New Sou t h Wales, Street J . found no distinction 
9. 
between Di llon's case and the issue in Schaefer's case. He referred to 
Di l lon as a powerful, and in his view, a conclusive decision. The learned 
judge concluded that the effect of the decision of the Privy Council was but 
an instance of the general proposition enunciated in Re Brookman 's TY'Ust 4 3 : 
If a testator is bound to make a will in a certain form, 
the law says there is no breach provided he makes a will 
in due form, and it is not owing to any act of his that 
the child does not take. 
He therefore held that the court had jurisdiction to interfere with the 
disposition to the housekeeper. Mr Justice Street found that three of the 
daughters had made out deserving claims for relief and ordered their legacies 
to be increased by charging the property gi ven to Mrs Schaefer and reducing 
the residue of the estate. 4 4 
3. Privy Council 45 - majority 
On appeal, Mrs Schaefer did not dispute that the testator had failed 
to make adequate provision for the three da ughters or the propriety of 
the orders made by the court in their favour. Rather, she contended that 
the court had no jurisdiction to throw any of the burden of such orders on 
the property given to her but that the whole burden should come out of the 
residuary estate left to the three sons. She argued that an order under 
the Act could not override or destroy eq ui table proprietary rights acqui red 
by t he third person under a contract in which the deceased promised to 
leave property t o such person by will. 
In a complete volte face, the majority of the Privy Council declined 
to follow Dil l on 's case, Lord Cross of Chelsea giving the advice of the 
Board concluded 46 : 
If and so far as it is thought desirable that the courts 
of any count ry should have power to interfere with 
testamentary dispositions made in pursuance of bona fide 
cont racts to make them, it is, their Lordships think, 
better that such a power should be gi ven by l egislation 
fra med with that end in view rather than by the placing 
of a construction on legislation couched in the form of 
that under consideration in this case which results in 
such astonishing anomalies, as flow from the decision in 
:Ji l lon . 
10. 
Their Lordships considered the apparent meaning of the Act to be 
that the court is given power to make such provision for members of the 
testator's family as the testator ought to have made, and could have ffiade, 
but failed to make. In other words, the court is not being given power 
to do something which the testator could not effectually have done hi m-
self. In their opinion this receives strong support from s.4(1) of 
the New South Wales Act which states that a provision made under the Act 
is to operate and take effect as if it had been made by a codicil executed 
by the testator immediately before his death. The testator would not be 
entitled to dispose of contracted property by such a codicil contrary to 
the agreement, therefore their Lordships infer that the court cannot affect 
such property either. There is no similar provision in the New Zealand 
Act but Lord Cross believes: 47 
... section 4(1) of the New South Wales Act only 
emphasises and makes explicit what would be implicit 
in the Act if it were not there. 
Thus, the beneficiary theory was finnly rejected in favour of the creditor 
theory. 
The anomalies to which their Lordships refer were convassed by Myers 
C.J. in Dillon , and brought him to the same conclusion as the majority in 
Schae f er. The common law relating to contractual testamentary benefits 
may be summarised as follows 48 : 
(a) Hanmers ley v . De Biel 49 decided that if the testator 
fails to leave a legacy as he has contracted to do, the 
promisee can claim the amount of the legacy from the 
estate of the promisor. 
(b) Even where the promisor keeps the promise and leaves the 
legacy, the promisee may still be regarded as a creditor 
of the estate rather than a beneficiary under it. So 
that. for example. the value of the estate for duty pur-
poses is reducible by the amount of the obligation: 
Cof fill v . Commissioner o: Stamp Duties . so 
(c) If the promise to leave specific property (as distinguished 
11. 
from a general legacy) the promisee is in a stronger 
position, since if the promisor deals with the pro-
perty in his lifetime in a manner inconsistent with 
the contract, the promisee can treat the promise as 
repudiated and sue for breach. Damages will be 
assessed subject to a reduction for the acceleration 
of the benefit, and for the contingency of his failing 
to survive the promisor if the benefit is personal to 
the promisee. If he is able to intervene before the 
property reaches the hands of a bona fide purchaser 
without notice, he can, with an injunction, restrain 
the testator for dis po sing of it. The proDisee has 
a right to specific performance against anyone who 
takes the property with notice, or even those who take 
without notice if volunteers (e.g. testamentary bene-
ficiaries). Synge v . Synge 5 1 and Central Trust and 
Safe Deposit Co . v . Snider 52 are authorities for these 
propositions. 
(d) If the testator dies insolvent, then whether or not he 
has performed his promise, the other party to the con-
tract is entitled to claim as a creditor for the amount 
of the legacy, in competition with other creditors of 
the same degree: Graham v . Wickham 5 3 • In the case of 
a specifically enforceable contract, the promisee is 
entitled to specific performance as against the trustee 
of the insolvent estate, and so is in a better position 
than a creditor having only a debt: Exp . Rab::idge , 
In r e Pooley 5 4 ; Re Bastable , exp . The T1"Ustee . 55 
(e) The promisee's position is much weaker if the contract 
is to leave a share cf the residue, since residue is 
only ascertained after debts have been paid: ~erJis 
v . Wolferstan . 56 But even in that case, the testator 
will not be permitted fraudulently (in the sense used 
in equity) to render his promise nugatory by making 
substantial gifts inter vivos or by way of specific 
1 egacy: GN, 021 v . Kel"T!: • 5 7 
12. 
Their Lordships considered three anomalous results arising from the 
Dillon decision 58 : 
(1) Where the testator dies in~olvent, the promisee is 
entitled to the property in the case of a specifically 
enforceable contract, or to claim as a creditor for 
the amount of a general legacy. But if t he testator 
dies solvent, the whole property might be given to 
the family protection claimants to the exclusion of 
the promi see. 
(2) Where a testator parted with property specifically 
promised during his lifetime, he would have to pay 
daffiages at that date. If the contract was kept 
the property might be taken from the promisee by an 
exercise by the court of its power under the Act. 
In i:lon 's case, Viscount Simon suggested there was 
no difficulty because any damages which the promiser 
was ordered to pay would be assessed in the light of 
the possibility of the exercise by the court of its 
jurisdiction. In other words, the award of damages, 
whi eh wi 11 repay the loss suffered by B from A' s 
breach of contract, is the equivalent of the benefit 
which B would have enjoyed if the contract had been 
perfonned, but that benefit is the value of the 
property less the extent to which it would be reduced 
by a redistribution due to the application of the 
Family Protection Act 1955. Lord Cross retorted 60 : 
... it is difficult to see how in practice any 
deductions could be made for the contingency 
since at the date of the breach sued on,it 
would be quite uncertain whether or not any 
occasion for exercise of the court's powers 
under the Act would arise on the testator's 
death. 
Also, the reasoning in Dillon forgets that the promisee may have a right 
to specific perfonnance. 
(3) If the promise did bring about a situation where the testator 
was, at the date of his death, trustee for the promisee, 
13. 
then it is difficult to see how a family protection order 
could be made against the property. If this is so, 
Dillon authorises the court to intervene with pro-
perty beyond its jurisdiction. 
These anomalies were considered sufficiently serious to justify 
rejecting the decision in Dillon . 
4. Privy Council - dissentient 
In his forceful dissenting judgment, Lord Simon of Glaisdale con-
sidered it more desirable to adopt a construction which accorded w
ith the 
ascertainable intention of the legislature. He perceived the stat
utory 
objective to be the prevention of family dependants being thrown on
 to 
the world with inadequate provision when the person on whom they we
re 
dependent dies possessed of sufficient estate to provide for or con
tribute 
towards their maintenance.
61 In his Lordship's view, DilZon 's case was 
correctly decided. 
The basis of Lord Simon's opinion is primarily public policy. He 
finds authorities to support his interpretation and attempts to rec
oncile 
the 'anomalies', but does not hide the fact that he is choosing the
 result 
which 'promotes justice between conflicting interests' .
62 Lord Simon 
suggests it is best to give the court a discretion to decide each c
ase on 
its facts. 
Such a solution would balance the three sorts of social obligation 
to which legal effect has been given.
63 The first of these is the enforce-
ment of contractual obligations if the promisor makes, or dies in, 
default. 
Secondly, the law (as developed in the courts of Equity) will gene
rally 
compel the personal representative to do what the deceased should h
ave done. 
Thus, where A covenants to bequeath property to B, A's personal rep
resenta-
tive will generally be constructive trustee of the property for B. 
The 
third type of obligation - that of a deceased to provide for his de
pendants -
arises juristically from the statute, which empowers the court to o
rder the 
personal representative to do what the deceased should himself have
 done. 
Lord Simon concluded 64 : 
But in the instant situation, in my view, none of the 
14. 
three types of obligation overridesany other; they 
are concurrent. The promisee's contractual or 
equitable rights fall to be considered along with 
the dependant~ statutory rights. 
In deference to the emphasis put on the 'anomalies' by the majority, 
Lord Simon tentatively suggested three ways of reconciling Dillon 's case 
with the Common Law. 65 First, he suggested damages for breach of the 
statute. This was persuasively rejected by Lord Cross as impractical.
6 6 
Secondly, the court could imply into every covenant to leave property by 
will a proviso: "sub ject to the statutory discretion vested in the court 
to order family protection". Lord Simon argues an implied proviso would 
be closely analogous to the refusal of the law to allow any contractual 
derogation from its discretionary power to order maintenance for an ex-
wife: Hyman v . H;;rrJan 67 • In this writer's view, Hyman is not authority 
for such a wide proposition - such a proviso can only be read into a 
contract entered into by the dependant. This is already the law in New 
Zealand 6 8 , butLordSimon does not provide a logically compelling reason to 
extend the principle to contracts entered into by the testator other than 
to effect his Lordship's preferred policy. A third alternative is to draw 
a distinction between a promise to leave by will a specific sum or asset 
on the one hand, and a share of the residue on the other. This would be 
unjust in some instances, and is not convincing as it resolves only some 
of the authorities. Lord Simon concludes with a scathing rebuke of the 
majori ty 6 9 : 
... the alleged ano~alies largely disappear if ancient 
authorities decided in a different social context are 
not carried forward hypnotically to what may seem their 
logical conclusions regardless of the i mpact of a 
modern statute of clearly ascertainable social purpose. 
Early in his judgment, his Lordship presents a fact situation which 
would result in gross injustice if Dillon was overruled
70
: 
... a widower is left with two infant children; he 
proposes marriage to another women, promising to 
bequeath her the whole of his estate if she will 
accept him; she does accept him on these terms; 
he dies shortly afterwards; the court is powerless 
to order any provision out of his estate for his 
i n fa n t c h i l d re n . 
In the writer's view, this is certcinly unfortunate but no more so than if 
..., 
15. 
the husband had gambled the money away, or transferred the property inter 
vivos, in which case the court cannot protect the children. The scope 
of the court's jurisdiction and meaning of the 'estate of the deceased' 
should not be determined on the basis of arbitrary examples of injustice. 
It is also unfair to defeat the expectations ofthe promisee. If the 
desired result is inconsistent with the promisee's Co1TJTJon Law rights as 
a creditor of the estate, and cannot be achieved without straining the 
language of the Act, then the appropriate solution is not judicial, as 
attempted by Lord Simon and Dillon , but legislative amendment. 
5. Is Promi sor a Trustee? 
The Privy Council did not seriously consider whether an equitable 
interest in the land had passed to Mrs Schaefer upon the making of the 
contractual devise. If the testator was merely a trustee of the property, 
it would not be part of his estate 71 and therefore outside the jurisdiction 
of family protection statutes. 
Counsel for Mrs Schaefer submitted that where a contract is made to 
leave specific property by will the testator becomes a constructive trustee 
for the promisee. 72 The only asset which then remains in the testator is 
the oare legal title. The Board did not explicitly accept this submission, 
but based its decision on acceptance of the creditor theory rather than 
the beneficiary theory of entitlement. One corrunentator has argued that 
the case could have been simply decided on the basis that the testator had 
alienated his interest in the land before he died, and it was not part of 
the property the subject of his will. 73 
Authority for this proposition is In r e Edi.Ja.rds fdecc . )
7 4 in which 
the testatrix made a contract to leave her home to her housekeeper. 
Jenkins L.J. in the Court of Appeal said the effect of the contract was 
that 7 5 
... at the time of her death the testatrix was a bare 
trustee of the property for the [promisee] ... 
Romer L.J. said that 76 : 
... the testatrix had parted with the whole beneficial 




Likewise, Lord Parker for the Privy Council in Central TI"~st and Safe 
Deposit Co . v . Snide1° said 7 7 : 
... if a person agrees for valuable consideration to 
settle a specific estate he becomes a trustee of it 
for the intended objects. 
In Re Edwards was considered in Re Seery but Street J chose to 
follow the apposite decision of Dillon 78 : 
In effect the c c1s1on in Jillon 's case brings about 
a situation in which the promisee under a contract 
to make a will in a particular form must accept that, 
whatever equities he may have in the property the 
subject of that contract ... his rights are subject to 
inroads being made upon the property by a court 
exercising statutory jurisdiction under legislation 
such as the Testator's Family Maintenance Act of 
this State or the Family Protection Act of New 
Zealand. 
In the writer's opinion, this conflicting and uncertain state of the 
case law can only be adequately remedied by legislation. As the next 
two cases show, New Zealand has not been saved from judicial inconsistency. 
C. Re Webster (decd.) 79 
1. The Facts 
The testatrix devised and bequeathed her house to three sons in 
fulfilment of a contract with them: they agreed to pay all outgoings in 
respect of the house and renovate and maintain the same in consideration of 
the testatrix leaving the house to them as tenants-in-common in equal 
shares, subject to their paying to her other son and three daughters the 
sum of tl,400 to be divided equally between them. The testatrix lived 
for seventeen years after the will was made and at her death the house 
was valued at four times the value assessed in 1956. At the time the will 
was made the children would have shared in the assets equally and borne the 
liabilities equally. 8 0 Proceedings were brought by the deceased's daughters 
under the Family Protection Act. 
17. 
2. The Decision 
The issue in the case for Wild C.J. came down to whether the court 
should apply Dillon or Schae f er . The learned Chief Justice accept
ed the 
authority of Schae f er. He perceived the ratio of the Privy Counc
il's 
advice to be that the 'estate' out of which provision can be made i
s that 
part of it which the testator is free to deal with. Because of th
e 
similarity in the essential terms of s.4 in the New Zealand Act and
 s.3(1) 
in the New South Wales Act, Wild C.J. concluded that the above prin
ciple 
must now apply in New Zealand as it does in New South Wales. Accord
ingly, 
there was no property to which an order could apply. He expresseo
 the 
opinion that although in Schae f er's case the Privy Council merely d
eclined 
to follow Dillon 's case, the effect is the same as if tbe Board had
 ex-
pressly overruled it. 
3. Testamentary Provisions Legislation 
Before Wild C.J., a new argument was pressed that would not have be
en 
available in appeal from New South Wales. Under the Law Reform (T
esta-
mentary Promises) Act 1949, s.3(1), if a testator promises to make 
some 
testamentary provision in return for work performed or services ren
dered, 
and fails to honour his promise, it is to be enforced against the e
xecutors 
in the estate for: 
... such amount as may be reasonable, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, including in parti-
cular the circumstance in which the promise was made 
and the services rendered or the work was performed, 
the value of the services or work, the value of the 
testamentary provision promised, the amount of the 
estate, and the nature and amounts of the claims of 
other persons in respect of the estate, whether as 
creditors, beneficiaries, wife, husband .... 
This provision, which was put into its present form by amending 
legislation in 1961 8 1 , shows clearly that in cases to which the Act
 applies, 
the testamentary promise claimant in New Zealand is not given autom
atic 
superiority over members of the family, but must take his chances a
long 
with everyone else. One corrmentator has noted
82
: 
... today we have comprehensive and eclectic provisions 
granting the court wide discretionary powers capable of 
embracing nearly all conceivable situations. hese 
powers are broad enough to permit a court to satisfy 
its own sense of j ust i ce in the indi vid ual case. 
18. 
It was argued on behalf of the applicants that this enactment 
affected the meaning and scope of the 'estate' mentioned in s.4 of the 
Family Protection Act 1955: contracted property should not be automatically 
excluded from the court's jurisdiction but enforced against the estate only 
to such an extent as the competing statutory and contractual claims ceem 
reasonable. Because the Testamentary Promises legislation applies to 
promises which may be contractually binding (s.3(8)), similar considera-
tions as those detailed in s.3(1) should be relevant to the enforcement of 
contractual promises. The learned Chief Justice dismissed this argument 
on the ground that the legislation only supplemented and did not displace 
any remedies available to those who claim under contracts to make wills.
83 
But it may be objected that Wild C.J. gave too little weight to 
the 1961 amendment. It specifically required the court to 'balance' 
the te stamentary promise claims against claims of other creditors and 
members of the deceased's family. Prior to 1961, the court only had 
this balancing power if the testator himself had failed to specify a 
set amount, or if his promise related to real or personal property other 
than money. If he chose to promise money, then the amount promised would 
rank as a debt in the estate, presumably with priority over family pro-
tection claimants. In this writer's opinion, the 1961 amendment is a 
valuable indication of legislative philosophy. It may be argued that 
a testamentary promise is of lesser quality, by definition, than a 
contract, and so requires different considerations, but this does not 
destroy the fact that the legislature favours the court exercising a 
discretion by 'balancing the equities'. 
D. Breuer v. Wright 84 
The testator contracted to forgive a business debt - and this was 
done in a codicil to his will. After finding that a valid contract existed, 
White J. had to consider a claim by the widow under the Family Protection 
Act 1955. After outlining the decisions in the three cases already dis-
cussed, the learned judge referred to the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
decision ·,n Lilley v. Public Trustee 85 in which the Law Reform (Testa-
mentary Promises) Act 1949 was analysed. Mr Justice White compared the 
'balancing test' required by that legislation with the principle in D~llon 's 
case that the interposition of the court should take place only after con-





was under an obligation to third parties. 86 He further observed that 
the Family Protection Act 1955 was a consolidation Act to which the 
presumption that Parliament does not intend to al ter the existing law 
applied. 8 7 Also relevant was the lack of any legislative amendment to 
alter the result in Dillon 's case. 88 
White J. concluded that at first instance he should apply the ratio 
decidendi of the Privy Council in Dillon 's case, that being an appeal from 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal 8 9 , but admitted favouring that decision 
in prefere nce to s~h.ae;er anyway. That was beca use it had been the law 
in New Zealand for many years and better accorded wi th the history of 
our legislation. 
The rest of this paper will consider how this conflict of di amet r i cal ly 
opposed decisions should be resolved. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
There is an urgent need in New Zealand for a decisive and 
authoritative resolution to the conflict between the benefic
iary theory 
and the creditor theory. Whether the provisions of our Fa
mily Protection 
legislation should extend to property, the subject of a cont
ract to confer 
a benefit by will, must ultimately depend upon policy consid
erations: the 
objective of the Act, and relevant social and legal values. 
A. Legislation 
Section 3 of the Destitute Persons Act 1894 provided: 
Every near relative of a destitute person, if that 
relative is of sufficient ability, is liable for 
the maintenance of that destitute person in a manner 
hereinafter provided. 
The legislation more specifically ensured maintenance of wiv
es by their 
husbands, and of children under sixteen years by their paren
ts. It was 
argued during the debate of the Testator's Family Maintenanc
e Bill 1900 
that if a man, while alive, left his wife or family destitut
e, they had 
the Destitute Persons Act 1894 under which provisions might 
be made for 
their maintenance and support, but similar powers should be 
given in the 
event of the husband dying.
90 This reasoning found favour in the New 
Zealand Parliament as evidenced by the enactment of the Bill
, described 
by one commentator as 9
1
: 
... unquestionably one of the great and original 
contributions of New Zealand to modern law. 
The necessity or at least the desirability, in the public in
terest 
of family protection legislation is demonstrated by the way 
in which, after 
originating in New Zealand, it spread through the Australian
 States and 
most of Canada, and was adopted is modified form in England
 in the Inheri-
tance (Family Provision) Act 1938. 
In the writer's opinion, there were three elements in the ra
tionale 
behind the aforementioned legislation. The first element w
as society's 
belief that the head of the house has an obligation to prov
ide for his 
21. 
dependent family - during his life, and after it. 
by the Privy Council in 193892 : 
The dominant purpose of the [New Zealand Family 
Protection] Act is to enable the court to remedy 
a .breach by a person of his moral duty as a wise 
This was enunciated 
and just husband or father to make proper pro-
vision, having regard to his property, for the 
maintenance, education and advancement of his family. 
This 'old-fashioned' attitude is no longer so persuasive as a result of 
the move away from a patriarchial social structure. It is still relevant 
where one spouse is the family breadwinner. 
The second element was articulated by Lord Simon of Glaisdale under 
the heading 'the mischief of the statute' in his judgment in Schaefer 93 : 
Men and women necessarily have different functions 
to perform in the creation of new members of society 
and in their upbringing to independent membership. 
a functional division of cooperative labour generally 
calls for a sharing of the rewards of the labour . 
.. . the man incurs an obligation to sha re the loaf 
with the woman and the woman acquires a right to 
share in it. 
Marriage is seen as a partnership but there is more opportunity for equal 
earning capacity and accumulation of wealth between spouses. A more 
modern objective of the family provision legislation is a sharing of assets 
upon death 94 , rather than one spouse 'providing' for the other. 
The third element was expressed by the Hon. Mr McNab, M.P., when 
moving the second reading of the Testator's Family Maintenance Bill 1900, 
in these terms 75 : 
The question to be decided in regard to this Bill was, 
was the State to be liable for the wife and children, 
or was the estate to be liable? The estate of the 
deceased person should be responsible. 
Thus, the Act was passed partly to prevent dependants of the testator 
becoming a burden to the state 96 . With the growth of the welfare state, 
the state is more wi l ling to support 'destitutes' e.g. Domestic Purposes 
22. 
Benefit, Widows Benefit. 
The Act has become more than one simply for the protection of 
destitute persons because implicit in the Act and explicit in the court's 
decisions is the recognition of society that dependants have adequate 
maintenance, not merely subsistence, and also that the surviving spouse 
receives a fair share of the deceased's estate. Even adult children of 
independent means have claims for proper maintenance provided they can 
prove the breach of a moral duty neither fulfilled in the testator's will 
nor during his lifetime. 97 
The essential question is whether the rationale and objectives 
extend to giving the court jurisdiction to intervene with contracts to 
devise or bequeath property. This would be in accord with the liberal 
appreciation of the Act, and would ensure its objectives could not be 
avoided. The principles opposed to these purposes are freedom of 
testation, sanctity of contract, and certainty of contract. 
B. Freedom of Testation 
Limitation on the freedom of testation is, in fact, a principle of 
greater antiquity than the principle of free testation.
98 The protection 
of the family as an essential unit in society has been a primary concern 
of most systems of law, thus it is generally regarded that family claims 
are a legitimate restriction on will making.
99 However, it has been said 10 c: 
... the intention of the testator should be interferred 
with as little as possible having regard to the objects 
of the Act. 
Indeed, s.11 of the Family Protection Act serves as a reminder to the court 
of the importance of the testator's reasons for making his will. The 
Privy Council has been at pains to point ~ut that the Family Protection Act 
1 n 
does not impose any duty to frame a will /any particular way: it merely 
confers upon the court a discretionary jurisdiction to override what would 
otherwise be the operation of a will by ordering that additional provision 
should be made for certain relations out of the testator's estate, notwith-
standing the provisions which the will actually contains.
101 This,in the 
writer's opinion, is an artificial proposition for although there is no 
23. 
legal obligation, the testator is said to have a 'moral duty' to make 
adequate provision, and the courts unmistakenly do revise a will. 
Certainly the will stands until impeached, but giving the court power of 
interference implies an obligation of sorts. The courts claim they 
have no power to re-write the will in a way they consider just, but surely 
they go some way towards doing that . As Hannan J. has said 1 02 : 
. . . under the Act a man's will is no more than a 
tentative disposition of his property pending an 
ultimate decision by the court. 
It is the writer's view that principles of testation are not ones which 
should override the court's power to make orders over contracted testa-
mentary benefits. 
c. Contractual Principles 
Next, consideration is given to the importance of contractual 
principles. Sir Ge orge Jessel, M.R., declared in 1875 1 03 : 
[I]f there is oneifhing which more than any other public 
policy requires / is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts, when entered into freely and 
voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by the Courts of Justice. 
The age of laisse -faire passed and to some extent took with it the above 
concepts. 104 By the middle of the twentieth century notions of inequality 
of bargaining power and unconscionable contracts had highlighted the fact 
that freedom of contract was no longer sacred. 1 05 But these historic 
foundations of the law of contracts are not yet anachronisms for as Barker 
J. in the High Court in 1976 commented 1 06 : 
The old laws concerning the sanctity of contract have 
less rigid application than they did in Victorian days, 
however, the principle that contracts fully negotiated 
should be upheld by the courts is one which should be 
borne in mind. 
Wide-ranging judicial discretion has been a feature of recent New 
24. 
Zealand legislative contractual reform, such that sanctity and certainty 
of contract become merely considerations in achieving a result which is 
fair and just. For example: 
Minors' Contracts Act 1969 
Illegal Contracts Act 1970 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
If commercial contracts can be impeached on grounds of 'injustice' and 
'unfairness', so should family provision defeating contracts. Such a 
discretion is given to the court by s.21 of the Matrimonial Property Act 
1976: an agreement, made under s.21 by the husband and wife for the 
specific purpose of contracting out of the provisions of the Act, shall be 
void where the court is satisfied it would be unjust 1 0 7 to give effect to 
the agreement. The majority in Schae f~1~ were unwilling to read in such 
a discretion into the Family Protection Act. 
D. Conclusion 
The Privy Council did not doubt that Gardiner v . Boag
10 8 and Par:sh 
v . Par i sh 1 0 9 were rightly decided: a wife could not surrender her statutory 
right to maintenance and support out of the estate of her deceased husband 
in a contract with her husband, before or after marriage. 11
0 Likewise in 
regard to the Destitute Persons Act 1910, it was held in A. v . A. 
111 that 
no agreement between husband and wife is effective to prevent the wife 
enforcing any liability for her maintenance or affect the jurisdiction of 
the Magistrate to make a maintenance order. That result was authorised by 
s.24 of that enactment. Therefore it may be argued that the absence of 
any such provision in the Family Protection Act leaves the court with no 
authority to avoid a contract between the parties. But the result in 
Gardiner and Parish is based on policy 11 2 : 
... [the Act] is a declaration of state policy, and 
that as such is paramount to all cont racts. 




The majority limit their decision to 113 : 
. . . contracts made by a testator not with a view to 
excluding the jurisdiction of the court under the 
Act but in the no·mal course of arranging his 
affairs in his lifetime .... 
What they term a 'bona fide contract'. In the writer's opinion, if 
sanctity of contract is the preferred principle then this exception to 
the genera 1 rule in S hae- f e y, is not j us tifi ed; but if the preferred 
principle is family provision, then the Schae f er' decision cannot be 
supported. The ~e is no half-way house. But which is the preferred 
policy? 
Sanctity and certainty of contract are no longer rigid principles 
but flexible considerations for the court's discretion. Freedom of 
testation is a fallacy. Thus, opposition to court interference with 
contracts is not as strong as it once was. But still the question 
remains: does the rationale behind the Family Protection Act demand it? 
That rationale has changed since 1900. The Act goes beyond relief of 
destitution to provision in a 'manner in which the dependants were 
accustomed'. That is not such a strong reason for impeaching contracts. 
But so long as the intention is to provide support and maintenance to 
deserving claimants (however these terms are defined), then that objective 
should not be defeated by contracts to confer benefits by will. A 
power of judicial review over such contracts is desirable so as to promote 
the legislative intention. Justice is achieved neither by always up-
holding the contract nor by over-generously providing for the family, but 
by "balancing the equities". 
Remembering that full title is not actually transferred until the 
will takes effect, no great hardship is incurred by the promisee if his 
expectation is to a degree defeated - as there is always an element of 
uncertainty because the time of death of the testator/promisor is un-
predictable. Solemn regard should be given to the contract, especially 
if it is a 'con111ercial agreement' but each case should be decided on its 
unique facts. The promisee should rank as a beneficiary and not a creditor 






V. RESURRECTING THE BENEFICIARY THEORY 
If one concludes that the beneficiary theory gives effect to the 
preferred social policy, then the decision in Schae f er must be rendered 
nugatory. This may be achieved in two alternate ways: 
A. 
(i) a decisive Court of Appeal judgment approving Dillon ; 
and 
(ii) Legislative amendment. 
Appellate Authority 
The Court of Appeal is the most competent judicial body to inter-
pret indigenous social welfare legislation. This is because of the need 
to consider policy which may well be unique to New Zealand as a product 
of its legislative and social philosophy over the last century. 114 The 
only time the New Zealand Court of Appeal has decided this issue it has 
preferred the creditor theory - though not unanimously. 115 It is not 
wise to predict the outcome of an appeal of, for example, Breuer, because 
of the possible influence of s tar e deci si s: a discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 11 6 However, indications of the present 
courts' attitude to this type of legislation lend weight to the conclusion 
that the beneficiary theory reflects contemporary social attitudes, as 
articulated by the New Zealand judiciary. 
The court.in exercising its discretion under the Family Protection 
Act, has endeavoured, particularly in recent times, to ensure that its 
conscience will be guided by the social values prevailing at the time. 
This can be seen from the cases of Re Wilson 117 , Re 2 1 1 8 , and Re Sutton
11 9
• 
The cautious and conservative decision in Schaefer is thought to be aptly 
described by these words of Woodhouse J. in Reid v . Reid 1 2 0 : 
... social legislation which affects everybody is not 
always the comfortable environment of lawyers whose 
usual preserve is the conventional structure of 
property and contractual rights which have grown up 
around the interests of a relatively small and rather 
more affluent section of the corm1unity. 




justice, has applied the oft-cited dictum of McCarthy P. 121 : 
... the Family Protection Act is a living piece of 
legislation and an application of it must be governed 
by the climate of the times. 
On the basis of this cursory look at the approach of the Court of 
Appeal, there can be discerned a likened interpretation and flexible 
application of social welfare legislation that is more in accord with 
the beneficiary theory than the creditor theory. 
B. Legislative Amendment 
Intervention by the legislature would create a definitive source 
of law and 
schemes in 
approaches 
could encompass an embracing reform 
England, Canada and New South Wales 
New Zealand could adopt. 
1. Engl and 
in this area. Legislative 
are three alternative 
In the Report of the Law Commission (England) 1974 122 , distinction 
was drawn between a contract leaving property by will where the intention 
of the promisor is to defeat a claim for family provision and a contract 
to leave property by will where there is no such intention. In the 
fonner case, the Corm,ission thought that the court should have power to 
order family provision out of the benefit accruing to the promisee after 
taking account of any valuable consideration which had been given for the 
contract. In the latter case, where the necessary intention is not esta-
blished, the Commission saw no ground for giving the court power to inter-
fere. Further they recomnended that the court should have like powers where 
a deceased has entered into a contract that his personal representatives 
were to pay money or transfer other property out of his estate. Similarly, 
courts would be able to interfere with property transferred inter vivos, up 
to six years before death, if it was in their opinion, on the balance of 
probabilities, that in making the disposition, it was the intention of the 
deceased to defeat a claim for family provision. To arguments that these 
provisions would involve too great an interference with the freedom of 
an individual to dispose of his property as he pleases, that uncertainty 
would be created in the transaction of property, and it would be difficult 
in the case of a deceased person to produce e idence of an intention to 
28. 
defeat the claims of family members, the Commission answered 1 23 : 
In our view ... it is a matter of overriding importance 
to ensure that family provision laws are effective. 
The Commission felt any damages recoverable by the promisee for 
a breach of contract by the deceased should be reduced by the amount 
necessary to give effect to the order for family provision. Unfortunately, 
they did not consider the result of a breach of contract whilst the pro-
misor was alive and the difficult task of reducing damages to take account 
of possible family protection claims. 
The Commission's recommendations were enacted in the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. 1 2 4 Sections 10-13 deta i l 
the power of the court in relation to transactions intended to defeat 
applications for financial provision. 
2. Canada 
The relevant clause of the Canadian Draft Uniform Relief Act pro-
vides as follows 1 25 : 
16. Where a deceased: 
(a) has, in his lifetime, bona fide and for 
valuable consideration entered into a 
contract to devise and bequeath any 
property real or personal ; and 
(b) has by his will devised and bequeathed 
that property in accordance with the 
provisions of the contract; 
the property is not liable to the provisions of an 
order made under this Act except to the extent that 
the value of the property in the opinion of the 
judge exceeds the consideration received by the 
deceased therefor. 
If the requirements (a) and (b) of this provision are satisfied, 
the court would examine all contracts with a view to determining whether 
the consideration for the contract was enough. This is not a role the 





. . . it has been settled for three hundred years that the 
courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. 
The parties are presumed to be capable of appreciating their own interests 
and of reaching their own equilibrium. How can a court measure the value 
to a testator of a promise by his housekeeper, say, to look after him for 
the rest of his life - yet this is what the courts must do. Often a 
slight inequality of consideration is quite unintentional. 
In the Canadian Draft Act, unlike the English Act, intention to 
avoid family provision is not a necessary criteria. ' Bona fide' in 
paragraph (a) relates to whether the contract is binding or not. 1 27 
3. New South Wales 
The Law Reform Commission of that State commented in its 1974 
Working Paper 1 2 8 : 
Our view is that a legislative policy which, through 
the Act, restricts the freedom of testation must, if 
that policy is to be given full weight, be supported 
by a restriction on the freedom to enter into contracts 
to make wi 11 s. 
The Commission was aware that no proposal would be entirely satisfactory 
as it follows that one suffers if the rights of the other are said to be 
exclusive. It concluded that the better approach was to allow the court 
to balance the equities between the applicant on the one hand and the 
person named in the contract and the will on the other hand. 1: 9 
These views crystallised in the Commission's 1977 Report as a draft 
bill. 130 It explicitly recommended that Schae f er -z; . SchiA. .,,,J11,D:n be over-
ruled.131 Under clause 11(1) of the Draft Family Provision Bill, the 
court would be given power to appoint property promised by the deceased 
to pass to a person on or after his death, but only to the extent by which 
the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration to the 
deceased at the date of the promise. If there is no discrepancy, the 
court cannot make an appointment. Sub-section (2) declares that the court 
shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the 
circumstances in which the promise was made by the deceased person, the 








and financial resources of those parties. 
Section 11 of this Bill is based on s.11 of the English Act, but 
with an important modification. The fonner does not restrict the courts 
review power to contracts made with the intention of defeating an applica-
tion for family prov1s1on. Sub-section (2) of the Bill is very similar 
to s.11(4) of the English Act requiring the court to consider all the 
circumstances. A useful illustration of how this might operate is given 
in the CoITTTiission's 1974 Working Paper 132 : 
... where an applicant is a needy and deserving widow, 
her claim might prevail over that of a person who 
gave undervalue for his contractual benefit; or, 
where the claims of an applicant are less strong and 
almost full consideration was given for the benefit, 
the applicant might receive nothing or only part of 
that which the court might otherwise have ordered. 
The court may also consider the nature of the transaction: a family or a 
com1ercial arrangement. However, like the English fonnulation, the courts 
are required to inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration. 
4. Reconrnendations 
The simplest amendment New Zealand would adopt would be to define 
'estate' as including contractual testamentary benefits. The most ela-
borate amendments would be of the English and New South Wales prototypes. 
In this writer's opinion, 'intention to defeat family provision' 
should not be a pre-requisite to intervention by the court for the following 
reasons. First, it would be difficult to determine the true intention 
of the deceased, often resulting in mere speculation. Cordia 1 family 
relations would not necessarily indicate a bona fida intention, as, for 
example, a father may still wish to benefit his favourite son! Secondly, 
no convincing r€ason has been given why bona fide intention releases pro-
perty from the jurisdiction of the court. If the objective of the Act 
is to provide for deserving claimants, then they should be provided for 
from property disposed of by contract even with the best of motives. 
Thirdly, it is best left for the co~rt to consider whether the deceased's 
intentions and conduct towards the claimant make the latter more deserving 




The writer also submits that examination of the inadequacy of 
consideration should be a factor to be weighed by the court, and not a 
rigid pre-requisite to invoking the jurisdiction of the court. This 
is because of the difficulty that would be encountered by the courts in 
valuing respective promises. 
New Zealand has lost its initiative as innovator in Family Protection 
legislation. It should now adopt and adapt the English and New South 
Wales models. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lord Cross of Chelsea conTT1ented in Sc"haefer 1 33 : 
The question whether contracts made by a testator 
should be liable to be wholly or partially set 
aside by the court under legislation of this 
character is a question of social policy upon which 
different people may reasonably take different views. 
The law has been oscillating for the past fifty years and must be 
urgently clarified by a decisive Court of Appeal judgment or preferably 
a legislative amendment before further injustice is done. 
The parameters of the court's jurisdiction must be determined on 
the basis of policy. The creditor theory commands the weight of 
authority and has the practical advantage of being easy to apply. 
However, i t leads to the following anomalous result: the family protec-
tion claimant cannot lose his rights by agreeing with the testator that 
he will not bring family protection proceedings (Gardiner and Parish) but the 
testator can achieve the same result by contracting with favoured bene-
ficiaries. It is extraordinary that what the testator cannot do with 
the family protection claimants concurrence, he can do behind the latter's 
back. 
The application of the Family Protection Act as eviden ced by the 
moral duty test, has gone beyond the Act's original rationale. It 
would seem essenti a 1 that if the Act is to achieve its liberal and bene-
f i C i al purpose, it should not be easily defeated. The beneficiary theory 
is more in accord with public policy and ensures that the provisions of 
the Act are not avoiaed by a contract to confer a benefit by will. In 
the writer's opinion, the prime objective of the Family Protection Act -
justice-is more like l y to be achieved by giving the court a discretion to 
' balance the equities' between the promisee and deserving family provision 











The prioneering legislation , original in the Common Law world, was enacted 
in 1900 under the title of the Testator's Fa.rnily Maintenance Act, and 
became Part II of the Family Protection Act 1908 , and in an extended and 
amended form is now the Family Protection Act 1955 . 
Similar statutes were subsequently passed i n all the Australian states, 
s everal Canadian provinces , and England . For general reference , see: 
A. C . Stephens , Family Protection in Ne~ Zealcrnd (2 ed ., Butterworths , 
Wellington , 1957) ; R. J . Davern Wright , Testator 's Family Maintenance in 
Australia and New Zealand (3 ed ., The Law Book Co ., Sydney , 1974); E.L.G . 
Tyler , Family Provi sion (Butterworths , London , 1971); M. Nyein , The 
Family Protection Act 1955 : Its Effect and Operation in Recent '.:'imes, 
LL . M. Research Paper , (Wellington , 1981) . 
For property out of which the court has no jurisdiction to order provi-
sion , see : Blacktop (ed.) Nevill ' s Concise LauJ of :!"'r>usts~ WiZls and 
Administration in New Zealand (7 ed ., Butterworths , Wellington , 1980) 
333- 4 . 
In fact , contracts relating to wil l s , i . e ., wher e a testator has agreed 
for valuable cons i deration under a bona fide contract to confer a benefit 
by will , can be broadly classified under four headings . First , contracts 
to devise or bequeath specific property; secondly , contracts to leave 
a legacy ; thirdly , contracts t o leave either the whole or a specified 
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